Peer-Reviewed Publications
“CLEARLY A SUBJECTIVE DETERMINATION”: INTERPRETATIONS OF “UNDUE SUFFERING” AT THE CANADA AGRICULTURAL REVIEW TRIBUNAL (2000–2019)
Andrew Stobo Sniderman, Ottawa Law Review, Volume 53, Issue 2 (2022)
ABSTRACT
How much suffering does our legal system tolerate? This paper focuses on Canada’s federal Health of Animals Regulations, which purport to provide a measure of protection to farmed animals, notably during their transit to slaughterhouses. More specifically, this paper interrogates how the concept of “undue suffering” is interpreted by the Canada Agricultural Review Tribunal (CART) and Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) between 2000 and 2019. During this period, a total of 157 CART decisions applied the “undue suffering” standard with respect to provisions of the federal Health of Animals Regulations, guided in part by three significant FCA decisions. These cases allow us to conduct a longitudinal study of the standard of “undue suffering,” to see how it is interpreted and evolves over time. A core implication is that some degree of suffering was deemed reasonable, though the contours of this permissible suffering remained ambiguous. I argue that twenty years of CART cases demonstrate the shortcomings of regulations which are premised on a standard as vague as “undue suffering.”
LA COUR SUPRÊME DU CANADA, LE CODE CIVIL DU QUÉBEC ET LE RÔLE DES JUGES DE COMMON LAW: UNE ÉTUDE DES ARRÊTS DE 1976–2019
RÉSUMÉ
Cette étude porte sur les rapports entre la common law et le droit civil à la Cour suprême du Canada. Afin de notamment garantir une expertise en droit civil au plus haut tribunal du pays, au moins trois des neuf juges de la Cour suprême du Canada doivent être sélectionnés parmi les avocats et les juges du Québec. Par contre, plusieurs des causes portant sur l’application ou l’interprétation du Code civil du Québec sont entendues par des bancs avec une majorité de juges ayant uniquement une formation de common law. La jurisprudence de droit civil est donc en principe façonnée par des juges qui n’ont généralement pas de formation civiliste. Quel rôle les juges de common law à la Cour suprême adoptent-ils lorsqu’ils entendent des causes portant sur le droit civil ? Nous explorons cette question en trois volets. D’abord, un survol historique du bijuridisme au Canada confirme qu’à une certaine époque, le mandat de la Cour suprême était d’uniformiser le droit canadien aux dépens de la tradition civiliste. En deuxième lieu, nous examinons toutes les décisions de la Cour suprême ayant appliqué ou interprété le Code civil du Québec entre 1976 et 2019 afin d’évaluer le niveau d’engagement des juges de common law. Finalement, basées sur les tendances observées et l’analyse historique, nous offrons quelques pistes de réflexions sur le rôle des juges de common law à la Cour suprême.
EXPLAINING DELAYED CESSATION: RWANDAN REFUGEES IN ZIMBABWE
"Explaining Delayed Cessation: A Case Study of Rwandan Refugees in Zimbabwe," International Journal of Refugee Law, Volume 27, Issue 4, 1 December 2015, Pages 607–624.
ABTRACT
Cessation is a process that removes refugee status. If cessation occurs too soon, it risks the lives of individuals sent back to their countries of origin. If cessation happens too slowly or not at all, states may become more reluctant to accept refugees in the first place. The most recent experiment in cessation is underway – and well behind schedule. Two deadlines recommended by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the cessation of refugee status of Rwandans have come and gone, yet some 100,000 Rwandan refugees remain in countries of asylum. This article hypothesizes that the delay to implementation of Rwandan cessation by many African states is driven by regional political concerns with irregular migration. Unilateral cessation may cause undesirable irregular migration, which poses a challenge for a region composed of states with varying levels of support for cessation and at various stages of implementation. Cessation is a state prerogative but may only work effectively as an act of regional consensus. Meanwhile, Rwandan refugees are faced with indefinite uncertainty about their legal status. Most Rwandan refugees have not experienced premature cessation, but delayed cessation. If coordinated implementation of cessation does not occur, the outstanding Rwandan refugee population will dwindle slowly over time, primarily because individuals opt for voluntary return or host states increase local integration. As delays mount in implementation and enforcement of the ceased circumstances clauses, one must conclude that the UNHCR advisory deadlines for cessation were premature, or that cessation has not proved as effective as the 1951 Refugee Convention intended – or both.
CORRECTIVE AND EQUITABLE JUSTICE FOR OMAR KHADR
ABSTRACT
Omar Khadr stands for the melancholy proposition that Canadian courts will recognize a rights violation without demanding an effective remedy. Over the years, Khadr secured many legal remedies, but not the one he sought most: a repatriation order. Why? This paper ventures explanations by viewing the final five Khadr judgments through the lenses of corrective and equitable justice. The final section of the paper recasts the case for the repatriation of Omar Khadr based on two principal arguments. First, a context of structural injustice suggests the application of equitable remedial principles rather than corrective justice, even in the transnational context in which Canada cannot impose structural remedies. Second, the Khadr case suggests that declaratory relief is not an appropriate remedy when delay may cause irreparable harm and where the government may be credibly suspected of bad faith.
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND LEGAL CHALLENGES TO CANADIAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
Andrew Stobo Sniderman & Adam Shedletzky, "Aboriginal Peoples and Legal Challenges to Canadian Climate Change Policy", (2014) 4:2 online: UWO J Leg Stud 1 .
ABSTRACT
This article explores two litigation strategies for challenging Canadian climate change policy, both of which involve constitutional rights and Aboriginal peoples. First, the authors argue that Canada’s climate change policies can be challenged as infringements of the section 7 Charter right to security of the person of Canada’s most northerly Aboriginal peoples. Second, they argue that the impact of insufficient carbon emissions regulation on Aboriginal peoples may violate section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, which affirms the rights of Canadian Aboriginal peoples. Although the proposed litigation strategies face a number of challenges, the issues are justiciable. Furthermore, if one of these claims proceeded to trial, the government would be called upon to defend and justify its ongoing failure to reduce Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions.